We propose parametric constructive Kripke-semantics for multi-agent KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions of two basic functional building blocks, namely bias (or viewpoint) and visibility, functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic and epistemic accessibility relation. The doxastic accessibility relates two possible worlds whenever the application of the composition of bias with visibility to the first world is equal to the application of visibility to the second world. The epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the union of our doxastic accessibility and its converse. Therefrom, accessibility relations for common and distributed belief and knowledge can be constructed in a standard way. As a result, we obtain a general definition of knowledge in terms of belief that enables us to view S5-knowledge as accurate (unbiased and thus true) KD45-belief, negation-complete belief and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and S5-knowledge, respectively, and perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and accurate) KD45-belief, and all this generically for arbitrary functions of bias and visibility. Our results can be seen as a semantic complement to previous foundational results by Halpern et al. about the (un)definability and (non-)reducibility of knowledge in terms of and to belief, respectively.
Introduction
In [HSS09] , the problem of defining knowledge in terms of belief is studied from a modal logic perspective, where the authors show that "if knowledge satisfies any set of axioms contained in S5, then it cannot be explicitly defined in terms of belief. S5 knowledge can be implicitly defined by belief, but not reduced to it." Thereby, the standard notions of explicit and implicit definability from first-order logic are "lifted to the definability of modalities in modal logics in a straightforward way," so that "explicit definability is equivalent to the combination of implicit definability and reducibility." More precisely, [HSS09] :
Consider a logic Λ for knowledge and belief. Knowledge is explicitly defined in Λ if there is a formula DK (for "definition of knowledge") in Λ of the form Kp ↔ δ, where δ is a formula that does not mention the knowledge operator. Knowledge is implicitly defined in Λ if, roughly speaking, Λ "determines" knowledge uniquely. Syntactically, this determination means that any two modal operators for knowledge that satisfy Λ must be equivalent. Semantically, this means that two Kripke models of Λ with the same set of worlds that agree on the interpretation of belief (and on the interpretations of all primitive propositions) must agree also on the interpretation of knowledge.
Our contribution is to make the definability of S5-knowledge in terms of KD45-belief function-parametric as well as semantic-constructive (cf. Definition 3-8).
More precisely, we propose function-parametric constructive Kripke-semantics for multi-agent KD45-belief and S5-knowledge in terms of elementary set-theoretic constructions of two basic functional building blocks, namely (cf. Definition 2):
• bias, or viewpoint translocation (necessarily idempotent, e.g., the constant functions), and
• visibility transformation, for example:
-point confounding (non-injective when non-trivial), and/or -point confusing (or permuting, bijective on a sub-domain)
functioning also as the parameters of the doxastic and epistemic accessibility relation. Note that we mean "set-theoretically constructive," not "intuitionistic," in loose analogy with the set-theoretically constructive rather than the purely axiomatic definition of numbers [Fef89] or ordered pairs. 1 That is:
• our epistemic accessibility is the transitive closure of the union of our doxastic accessibility and its converse (cf. Definition 4);
• our doxastic accessibility relates two possible worlds whenever the application of the composition of bias with visibility to the first world is equal to the application of visibility to the second world (cf. Definition 3).
As a result, our constructions enable us to view
• S5-knowledge as accurate (unbiased and thus true) KD45-belief,
• negation-complete belief and knowledge as exact KD45-belief and S5-knowledge, respectively,
• perfect S5-knowledge as precise (exact and accurate) KD45-belief, and all this generically for arbitrary functions of bias and visibility in our sense (cf. Theorem 3). In comparison, recall from [FHMV95] the by-now classic constructive definition of agent-centric (say in agent a) epistemic accessibility ≡ a as state (say s and s ) indistinguishability s ≡ a s defined in terms of the equality between the projection π a (s) of s onto a's view and the projection π a (s ) :
Definition 1 (Epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability [FHMV95] ).
s ≡ a s by definition, if and only if π a (s) = π a (s ).
Thus ≡ a is defined to be the kernel of π a [SD08] . This definition is constructive in the sense that it not merely abstractly stipulates ≡ a to be an equivalence relation (that would be the standard modal-logical methodology [MV07] ) but it actually concretely constructs ≡ a in terms of the set-theoretic building block π a , a projection function (state visibility as state projection), which forces ≡ a to be an equivalence relation. (For more examples of more complex, constructive definitions of agent-centric accessibility relations, see [Kra12a, Kra12c, Kra12b] .) It is not at all obvious how to recover a definition of doxastic accessibility from this indistinguishability definition of epistemic accessibility. Nevertheless we present a simple, generic, and thus general solution to this important problem. Our solution is general in the sense that the extent to which it can be applied is the entire semantic scope (models) of standard doxastic and epistemic logic (cf. [MV07] and [HR10] for overviews), thanks to our soundness and completeness results in the sense of Theorem 1 and 2. Moreover, our proofs for the solution are simple, which increases its value. Here, the difficulty was to find our general definition of knowledge in terms of belief, which has even the feature of being generic thanks to its function parameters. Our findings can be seen as a semantic complement to previous foundational results by Halpern et al. about the (un)definability and (non-)reducibility of knowledge in terms of and to belief, respectively.
Parametric constructions and results

Let
• S designate a set of system states in computer-science, points in modallogical, or possible worlds in philosophical terminology;
• id S := {(s, s) | s ∈ S } the identity function on S ⊆ S ;
• Im(R) := {s ∈ S | there is s ∈ S such that s R s } the image of some (possibly functional) relation R ⊆ S × S .
Further let ":iff" abbreviate "by definition, if and only if".
Definition 2 (Doxastic-epistemic function pair). Two functions f : S → S and g : Im(f ) → Im(f ) form a doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) on S :iff
• or, equivalently, g is idempotent, i.e., g • g = g .
Fact 1. For all doxastic-epistemic function pairs (f, g) on S and s ∈ S there is s ∈ S such that g(f (s)) = f (s ) .
Proof. By the definitional fact that f is a totally defined operation on S and g is a totally defined operation on Im(f ); (Im(g) ⊆ Im(f )).
We shall use the two constraints in Definition 2 interchangeably; the two constraints are indeed equivalent, as asserts the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The two alternative constraints in Definition 2 are equivalent.
, and also g(g(f (s))) = g(f (s )). Hence g(g(f (s))) = g(f (s)). For the onlyif-direction, suppose that g • g = g, and let s, s ∈ S. Further suppose that g(f (s)) = f (s ). Hence g(g(f (s))) = g(f (s )). Hence g(f (s)) = g(f (s )) by the idempotency of g. Hence g(f (s )) = f (s ) by the last supposition.
The following main adequacy theorem asserts first that for all doxasticepistemic function pairs (f, g), D g f is indeed a standard doxastic accessibility relation, and second that for all standard doxastic accessibility relations R, a doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) can be constructed such that R = D g f . Theorem 1 (The KD45 Accessibility Schema).
) is a doxastic-epistemic function pair on S then for all s ∈ S :
(a) there is s ∈ S such that s D g f s (Seriality/Totality) (b) for all s , s ∈ S :
2. Completeness: If ∅ = R ⊆ S ×S is serial, transitive, and Euclidean then there is a doxastic-epistemic function pair (f, g) on S such that (f, g) is constructible from R and R = D g f . Proof. For soundness, assume that (f, g) is a doxastic-epistemic function pair on S. Then 1.a holds by Fact 1. For 1.b, let s, s , s ∈ S and suppose that g(f (s)) = f (s ). Hence g(f (s )) = f (s ) by the first alternative definitional constraint on f and g. For 1.b.i, further derive that g(f (s)) = g(f (s )) by the last supposition, and then further suppose that g(f (s )) = f (s ). Hence g(f (s)) = f (s ). For 1.b.ii, suppose that g(f (s)) = f (s ). Consequently, f (s ) = f (s ) by the last supposition and the first supposition of 1.b, and then g(f (s )) = f (s ) by the very first derivation.
For completeness, let ∅ = R ⊆ S × S and suppose that R is serial, transitive, and Euclidean. Then ≡ := {(s, s ) ∈ R | s ∈ Im(R)} ⊆ R is an equivalence relation (i.e., a relation that is reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean) on Im(R) :
• ≡ is reflexive: Let s ∈ Im(R), i.e., there is s ∈ S such that s R s. Thus s ∈ S. Hence there is s ∈ S such that s R s by the seriality of R. Hence s R s by the transitivity of R. Hence s R s by the Euclideanness of R. Hence s R s by the transitivity of R. And since s ∈ Im(R), s ≡ s.
• ≡ is transitive and Euclidean by inheritance, i.e., simply because R is.
Observe that for all s , s ∈ S, if s R s and s R s then there is C ∈ Im(R)/ ≡ such that s , s ∈ C. This is because s R s by the Euclideanness of R and because s , s ∈ Im(R) (thus s ≡ s ). Now define two functions f : S → S and g : Im(f ) → Im(f ) such that:
Notice that g is well defined, i.e., it does not matter which s we choose, since for all s ∈ S, if s R s and s R s then there is C ∈ Im(R)/ ≡ such that s , s ∈ C.
We will now see that R = D g f . So let s, s ∈ S. • Suppose that s R s . Thus s ∈ Im(R). Hence f (s ) = c s .
-Suppose that s ∈ Im(R). Hence s ≡ s by the first two suppositions (thus c s = c s ), and g(f (s)) = g(c s ) = c s . Hence g(f (s)) = f (s ).
-Now suppose that s ∈ Im(R). Hence g(f (s)) = g(s) = c s for some s ∈ S such that s R s . Hence s R s by the Euclideanness of R, and then s ≡ s . Thus c s = c s . Hence g(f (s)) = f (s ).
• Conversely suppose that g(f (s)) = f (s ). Notice in the definition of f and g that Im(g) ⊆ Im(R) and that s ∈ Im(R) if and only if f (s ) ∈ Im(R). Hence s ∈ Im(R), and thus f (s ) = c s . Hence g(f (s)) = c s .
-Suppose that s ∈ Im(R). Hence g(f (s)) = g(c s
The following proposition gives a functional characterisation of (i.e., a necessary and sufficient equational condition for) the symmetry (and hence the property of being an equivalence relation) of (f, g)-parametric doxastic accessibility relations. (Seriality, symmetry, and transitivity jointly imply reflexivity.)
−1 if and only if g = id Im(f ) .
Proof. The if-direction is immediate. For the only-if-direction, suppose that D
e., for all s, s ∈ S, g(f (s)) = f (s ) if and only if g(f (s )) = f (s). Further, let s ∈ S. Hence there is s ∈ S such that g(f (s)) = f (s ) by Fact 1. Hence g(f (s )) = f (s) by the first supposition, and also g(g(f (s))) = g(f (s )). Hence, g(f (s)) = g(f (s )) by the idempotency of g, and then g(f (s)) = f (s).
The following is our general definition of knowledge in terms of belief.
Definition 4 (Function-Parametric Epistemic Accessibility). Let D g f designate an (f, g)-parametric doxastic accessibility. Then we define our (f, g)-parametric epistemic accessibility relation E g f ⊆ S × S such that
where ' −1 ' designates the converse and ' + ' the transitive-closure operation.
The following adequacy theorem asserts first that for all doxastic-epistemic function pairs (f, g), E g f is indeed a standard epistemic accessibility relation, and second that for all standard epistemic accessibility relations ≡, a doxasticepistemic function pair (f, g) can be constructed such that ≡ = E g f . Theorem 2 (The S5 Accessibility Schema). , and D
The following proposition is the basis for our third main result, namely Theorem 3.
Proposition 3 (Doxastic-epistemic accessibility inclusions). For all doxasticepistemic function pairs (f, g) on S :
Proof. For 1, inspect definitions. 2 follows from Proposition 2 and the definition of E g f . For 3, inspect 2. Definition 5 (Doxastic-epistemic similarity type). Let
• P = ∅ designate some set of atomic propositions P ;
• T a set of types T such that S ∈ T ;
• G a set of typed function names g : T → T (abbreviated as g when clear from context) such that (id T : T → T ) ∈ G for all T ∈ T ;
• F a set of typed function names f : S → T (abbreviated as f when clear from context) such that (id S : S → S) ∈ F and if (f : S → T ) ∈ F and (h :
• Π B , Π K ⊆ Π := {(f : T → T , g : T → T ) ∈ F × G} belief-label and knowledge-label sets, and the so-called label set, respectively.
Then,
is a doxastic-epistemic similarity type.
Note the above-introduced notational conventions: we use f, g, and h as meta-variables for typed function names, and f , g, and h as meta-variables for typed functions; id S is an example of a (typed) function name, and id S is an example of a (typed) function.
Definition 6 (Functional doxastic-epistemic language). Given a doxastic-epistemic similarity type Σ with set P of atomic propositions, and belief-and knowledge-label set Π B and Π K , respectively,
is the doxastic-epistemic language over Σ.
We intend for the operators B g f and K g f to have flexible readings, though they generally relate to belief and knowledge, respectively. We may associate every pair (f , g ) with an agent a in some given set A of agents (as we do in Proposition 6). When doing so, we may read B g f as "agent a believes that φ" and K g f as "agent a knows that φ," where a is the agent associated with the pair (f , g ).
Definition 7 (Functional doxastic-epistemic models). Given a doxastic-epistemic similarity type Σ = (P, T , G, F, Π B , Π K ), let
• S, ι be a so-called Σ-instantiation structure on S with an interpretation function ι for types T ∈ T and typed function names constrained such that:
• V : P → 2 S a standard modal valuation function [BvB07] , mapping each atomic proposition P to the set of states where P is considered true.
, V is the doxastic-epistemic Σ-model on S, ι and V, and (S, s) a pointed doxastic-epistemic Σ-model on S, ι and V for any s ∈ S. 
• a standard satisfaction relation |= between pointed doxastic-epistemic Σ-models and their languages L(Σ) as in Table 1 ;
• S |= φ :iff for all s ∈ S, (S, s) |= φ ;
• |= φ :iff for all doxastic-epistemic Σ-models S, S |= φ .
The following theorem summarises our main results.
Theorem 3 (Doxastic-epistemic modality conditionals). The following proposition establishes formal correspondences to related work.
Proposition 6 (Related work).
Epistemic accessibility as state indistinguishability [FHMV95]: Let
where 0 designates a zero data point (e.g., an initial state) and α a an action performed by agent a ∈ A for some finite set A = ∅ of agents, and define the visibility π a in Definition 1 on S as
Thus we can reconstruct the standard agent-centric epistemic modality K a [FHMV95] in our framework with the following simple definition
for doxastic-epistemic similarity types such that
) | a ∈ A}, and Π B := ∅ ; and an interpretation function ι on types and typed function names such that ι(Im(pi a )) := Im(π a ) and ι(pi a ) := π a , respectively.
The resulting instantiation structure is (S, ι). [Par78] , by which Parikh established an upper, EXPTIME complexity bound for Epistemic Logic (also with common knowledge):
Epistemic Logic as
where [(α a ∪ (α a ) −1 ) * ] is the dynamic necessity modality with the program parameter (α a ∪ (α a ) −1 ) * for α a as before. Further, let α denote actions, and A and A action terms such as (α a ∪ (α a ) −1 ) * , and let
where R (αa∪(αa) −1 ) * is of course an equivalence relation.
Notice that R αa is not idempotent, and so (id S , R αa ) is not a doxasticepistemic function pair, but fortunately thanks to Theorem 2.2, there is a constructible π a : S → S such that 
Conclusion
We conclude by mentioning that from D g f and E g f , we can further construct accessibility relations for modalities of common and distributed belief and knowledge in a standard way [FHMV95, MV07] by taking unions and transitive closures of D 
